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OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL: WOULD DIRECT
REGIONAL REPRESENTATION BETTER
PROTECT UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?
Noah Bialostozky*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the United Nations Security Council
("Security Council" or "Council") has acknowledged a direct linkage be-
tween its mandate to prevent threats to international peace and security and
the prevention of gross human rights violations. The Council has accord-
ingly taken both direct and indirect measures to address such violations.
Direct measures have included the authorization of multilateral military in-
tervention and peacekeeping missions, and indirect measures have included
sanctions regimes and the establishment of ad-hoc tribunals. Yet, despite
its capacity under the United Nations Charter ("Charter") to take binding
action, the Council has failed to fulfill its global mandate consistently or
comprehensively.
Security Council failures have resulted largely from the collective
action failures inherent in its nation-state composition. The nation-states in
the Council have been unable to overcome their particular national interests
to consistently and comprehensively fulfill their Charter obligations. Re-
placing the current system with a system of regional representation could
prove beneficial to the Council's effectiveness in maintaining international
peace and security, including the prevention of gross human rights viola-
tions. Direct regional representation could prove beneficial by: (1) making
the Council a more representative and thus more globally legitimate institu-
tion; (2) easing the Council's global burden to maintain peace and security;
(3) mitigating the effects of inherent nation-state constraints on decision-
making and implementation; (4) enabling the Council to more effectively
overcome collective action problems; and (5) facilitating the use of indirect
methods of human rights enforcement.
* Noah Bialostozky, J.D. 2008, Order of the Coif, Northwestern University
School of Law, serves on the United Nations Law Committee of the International
Law Association, American Branch and is Chairman of the Branch's UN Human
Rights Council Sub-Committee. The author is also the former Editor-in-Chief of
the Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights. The ideas expressed in
this paper are attributable solely to the author. Special thanks to Professor Sandra
Babcock for her valuable comments.
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II. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations ("UN") was established in 1945 to maintain
international peace and security through collective measures for the preven-
tion and removal of threats to the peace.' Specifically, the Security Council
was given primary responsibility for fulfilling this mandate. 2 The UN and
the Council continue to have a broad and strong mandate for the prevention,
management and resolution of threats to the peace around the world.3 The
Council has the capacity under Chapter VII of the Charter to take various
forms of action to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and
acts of aggression.4 Council resolutions are legally binding on all UN state
parties,5 but require the support of all five permanent members ("P5") be-
cause each retains a veto power.6 In effect, the veto power has allowed the
P5 to largely steer the direction of Council decision-making and
intervention.
During the Cold War, the veto power of the USSR and the US left
the Council in a continual stalemate. 7 Even in the post-Cold War era, how-
ever, the Rwandan genocide,8 the Balkan crisis,9 and the current crisis in
1 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
2 The Council is comprised of five permanent members and ten rotating non-
permanent members. The ten non-permanent members are elected by regional
groups: two seats elected by the WEOG (Western Europe), one by the EEG (East-
ern Europe), two by the Latin American Group, and five by African and Asia
groups.
3 See UN Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55.2, 8th plen. Sess., U.N. Doc A/
55/22 (Sept. 8, 2000).
4 Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, specifically Articles 39-43 provide for various
measures, both military and non-military, to enforce the peace and the Charter. See
U.N. Charter arts. 39-43.
5 U.N. Charter art. 25 ("The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.").
6 The Permanent Five Members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
7 Elizabeth M. Cousens, Conflict Prevention, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 101,102-03 (David M. Malone ed.,
2004) ("A central theme of the Cold War UN was deadlock between the superpow-
ers in the Council and the frequent use (and threat) of the veto.") [hereinafter
Cousens in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL].
8 During the years 1993 and 1994, it is estimated that 800,000 Rwandans were
killed in an intrastate conflict. MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 97(2002).
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Darfur, Sudan' 0 highlight the Council's persistent failure to effectively ad-
dress human rights crises and international security breaches. The reliance
on nation-states for both decision-making and peacekeeping has led to sig-
nificant collective action failures. Nation-states are reluctant to take action
in regions where they have little or no national interest." Nevertheless, the
Council remains widely perceived as an indispensable means to reconcile
competing points of view and to maintain a basic level of continuity, order
and predictability as global power relationships evolve.' 2 In order for the
Council to effectively fulfill its mandate, the UN has recognized that the
Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation. Specifi-
cally, the UN recognizes that in years to come the Council will need to
depend on collective strategies, collective institutions and collective respon-
sibility to fulfill its global mandate.'
3
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The Security Council has a unique mandate among international
actors to produce lawful, binding resolutions to address threats to interna-
9 In the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into intrastate ethnic conflict
during which there was widespread ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
See generally WILLIAM JOSEPH BUCKLEY, Kosovo: CONTENDING VOICES ON BAL-
KAN INTERVENTIONS (2000).
10 Since early 2003, Sudanese government forces and ethnic militia known as
"Janjaweed" have engaged in an armed conflict with Sudanese rebel groups. As
part of its operations, government forces and the Janjaweed have waged a system-
atic campaign of ethnic cleansing against the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan.
See Human Rights Watch: Crisis in Darfur, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/
05/05/darfur8536.htm (last visited May 7, 2007).
" See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Eu-
rope's Practice and the United Nations, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 857, 876 (2004)
(describing how EU states, sitting in a national capacity on the Security Council
during the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003, positioned themselves based on national inter-
ests) [hereinafter Fassbender].
12 SHEPARD FORMAN AND ANDREW GRENE, COLLABORATING WITH REGIONAL OR-
GANIZATIONS, reprinted in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO
THE 21ST CENTURY 295, 303 (David M. Malone ed., 2004) [hereinafter FORMAN
AND GRENE].
13 See U.N. General Assembly, Secure World Report: Follow-up to the outcome
of the Millennium Summit, 15, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 55
(Dec. 2004) available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. ("But in the
twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Col-
lective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are
indispensable.").
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tional peace and security. Over the past few decades, the Council's opera-
tional definition of international peace and security has evolved to include a
broad range of security concerns, including gross human rights violations.14
The Council first began recognizing the relevance of human rights
to international peace and security with its sanctions in response to human
rights violations in Southern Rhodesia in 196815 and South Africa in 1977.16
The Council expanded its consideration and enforcement of human rights
protection in the early 1990s and has since occasionally responded to gross
violations with military authorizations. 17 The Council has also authorized
ad-hoc tribunals to hold perpetrators of gross human rights violations ac-
countable' 8 and has integrated human rights protection with its authoriza-
tion of peacekeeping missions. 19 Growing recognition that human rights
protection should be integrated with humanitarian interventions and
peacekeeping efforts has led the Council to become a critical actor in inter-
14 ROGER A. COATE, DAVID P. FORSYTHE & THOMAS G. WEiss, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 161 (2004) [hereinafter COATE ET AL.].
15 See S.C. Res. 253, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968) (condemning
the violation of Southern Rhodesians' fundamental rights and freedoms, calling on
the United Kingdom to take measures to protect civilians' Charter rights, and im-
posing sanctions).
16 See S.C. Res. 421, U.N. Doc. S/RES/421 (imposing sanctions on South Africa
for the treatment of civilians under the apartheid regime).
17 See COATE ET AL, supra note 14, at 156-57. In 1992, as a result of Security
Council Resolution 814, the UN took control of a military operation to maintain the
order necessary to feed starving civilians in Somalia. Also, in 1991, after the Per-
sian Gulf War, Council Resolution 688 declared that the international repercussions
of the human rights situation in Iraq, especially pertaining to the repression of Iraqi
Kurds, constituted a threat to international peace and security. Many argue that the
Council implicitly authorized the use of force to stop Iraqi repression of its citizens.
The Resolution led to UN creation of a protected area for Iraqi Kurds. See Joanna
Wechsler, Human Rights, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR
TO THE 2 1ST CENTURY 55, 57-58 (David M. Malone ed., 2004) [hereinafter Wechs-
ler in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL].
18 In 1993 and 1994, the Council authorized ad-hoc tribunals for the post-conflict
situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Joanne Lee and Richard Price,
Criminalization of International Violence, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL
SECURITY 123, 124 (Richard M. Price & Mark W. Zacher eds., 2004).
19 See Wechsler in The UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 55-56 (discuss-
ing the human rights component in Security Council peace-keeping authorizations
in El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti).
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national efforts to mitigate and end such violations. 20 More prominent ex-
amples of Council authorizations with significant human rights components
include multidimensional responses to crises in East Timor and Sierra Le-
one.2' And over the past two decades there have also been several other
examples of UN missions with significant human rights components.22
Despite the significant human rights element in several Council au-
thorizations, some argue that the Council's role should be restricted to inter-
ventions in response to humanitarian violations. 23 It is true that there are
two separate bodies of international law: one for human rights and another
for humanitarian law - with the latter pertaining only to situations of armed
conflict. There is increasing consensus, however, that fundamental human
rights law also applies in times of armed conflict. 24 In fact, because of the
intrastate nature of recent threats, there is growing recognition that gross
human rights violations are often indistinguishable from war crimes. The
20 See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General, An Agenda for
Peace, 15, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/23111 (Jan.
17, 1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace] ("UN has moved to integrate, to the
extent possible, its human rights and humanitarian efforts with its peace efforts.").
21 In 1998, the Council established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL);
one of the tasks of UNAMSIL was to provide regular reports on violations of inter-
national human rights and humanitarian law to the COUNCIL. Wechsler in THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 63.
22 Examples include the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM
I), the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans and the United Na-
tions Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). COATE ET AL., supra note 14,
at 172.
23 See, e.g., David Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Ad-
ministration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 695, 705 (2005)
(discussing the significance of distinctions between international humanitarian and
human rights law for decision-making in military operations).
24 Customary international law prohibits violations of fundamental human rights
in times of armed conflict and of relative peace. See John Cerone, Human Dignity
in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1447, 1448 (2006) ("[A] consensus is evolving in favor of the view that human
rights law applies in full alongside humanitarian law during times of armed conflict
and occupation."); see also Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N.SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex
1, 39, U.N.Doc, S/25274 (1993) (citing "relevant human rights law" and interna-
tional humanitarian law as rules of international law applicable to the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia).
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nature of threats to international peace and security increasingly do not in-
volve well-defined armies, and thus human rights protection is now often
considered the general protection of internationally recognized rights, re-
gardless of the underlying circumstance.25
The increasingly meaningless distinction between interventions
based on human rights or humanitarian law is demonstrated by the Coun-
cil's authorization responding to the Somalian crisis of the early 1990s. In
1992, the Council authorized intervention to curtail human suffering and the
threat to international peace and security in Somalia.26 To some, this reso-
lution was nothing more than traditional Council action responding to a
situation of armed conflict. Yet, to many international lawyers the Council
had, in effect, expanded the concept of international security to include in-
trastate human rights violations.27 More specifically, the authorization of
force was seen by many as a response to the codified human rights to life,
adequate nutrition and health care.28 Nevertheless, because of the uncertain
identity of the warring parties, and the parties responsible for the gross
human rights violations, whether the Council authorization was for reasons
of human rights or humanitarian law was a theoretical distinction without
operational significance. 29 The compelling point was that massive viola-
tions of recognized international rights, whether or not they occurred as part
of an armed conflict, were recognized as a threat to international peace and
security.
Although Council protection of human rights has been intermittent
depending on the political will of the P5, overall, the Council's attitude has
been evolving towards general acceptance of human rights violations as an
25 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 126.
26 S.C. Res. 794, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
27 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 126.
28 Id. The right to life is codified in Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 9, 17, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966). The right to an "adequate standard of living" and the right to the
"enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" are
codified in Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 11, 1 1, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966).
29 Id. But see FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1988) (discussing the importance of retaining the
distinction between humanitarian interventions and human rights interventions);
RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 418
(James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2002) (detailing operational distinctions be-
tween the application of human rights law and humanitarian law).
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integral part of its decision-making. 30 In the early to mid-1990s, each time
the Council addressed human rights violations, it felt compelled to justify
that the situation in question constituted a threat to international peace and
security. 31 But over time, the traditional inviolability of state sovereignty
has eroded, and the Council appears to have firmly accepted a direct link
between international security and human rights violations. 32 Gross human
rights violations have thus likely become an enduring part of the Council's
global sphere of responsibility.
IV. THE NATION-STATE SECURITY COUNCIL MODEL WILL CONTINUE TO
INCONSISTENTLY AND INEFFECTIVELY FULFILL ITS GLOBAL MANDATE
Despite its global mandate, the Security Council has been unable to
achieve a balanced and systematic record on human rights protection.
Since the end of the Cold War stalemate, the Council has been repeatedly
hamstrung by the P5's veto power.33 The regions represented in the P5
30 Wechsler in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 66.
31 For example, in April 1991, the Council passed Resolution 688 on the situation
in Iraq, condemning "the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts
of Iraq... [the consequences] of which threaten international peace and security in
the region." S.C. Res. 688, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). See also
S.C. Res. 745, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (Feb. 28 1992) (establishing the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia in order to protect civilians based on the need
to create conditions suitable for the maintenance of peace and security).
32 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1001, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1001 (June 30, 1995) ("calling on
the Liberian factions, especially the combatants, to respect the human rights of the
civilian population," without establishing a link between the human rights situation
and the maintenance of international peace and security). Also, in 1998, the Coun-
cil established the mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. The Council was
"gravely concerned at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the
people of Sierra Leone" and stipulated that the UN Mission should "report on vio-
lations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone" and
"assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's
human rights needs," without drawing a link between the human rights violations
and international peace and security. S.C. Res. 1181, 8-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1881, (July 13, 1998). Furthermore, in Resolution 1265 passed in 1999 on the
targeting of civilians in armed conflict, the Council condemned the deliberate
targeting of civilians by combatants as a violation of humanitarian and human
rights law. See S.C. Res. 1265, 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999).
33 See Cousens in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 103-05 (detailing
the Council's paralysis with respect to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda during the 1990s).
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have led to disparate incentives for action in differing parts of the world.34
Accordingly, the inherent constraints of nation-state decision-making based
on national interests have led to consistent collective action failures in the
Council.
A Security Council composed of nation-states inevitably produces
negotiations beset by the inherent constraints of national decision-making,
including economic and strategic considerations. The current nation-state
model has prevented the Council from fulfilling its global responsibility to
consistently address human rights violations that constitute threats to peace
and security. The nation-state composition has left the Council paralyzed
on nearly every issue - even on the most egregious violations of interna-
tional law on which unanimity might be expected. 35 The P5 and other
Council members have been very reluctant to intervene in conflicts that do
not pose a direct threat to their national interests, or that involve countries
with which bilateral relations might be compromised. 36
The political failings of the Council have been well-documented 37
and numerous reforms have been proposed.38 One notable set of potential
34 Id. (discussing post-Cold War Security Council failures with respect to Bosnia,
Angola, Somalia and Rwanda in the late 1980s and 1990s).
35 Sebastian Mallaby, Bound to Fail, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 2007, at 16 (discussing
the Council paralysis with regard to the recent crises in Darfur, Sudan and the
Congo, the human rights violations in Zimbabwe, and the crimes against humanity
in Kosovo in the 1990s).
36 See Fassbender, supra note 11, at 870 (describing failures of European states
and the United Nations to take action on issues of war, poverty and human rights in
Africa).
37 See, e.g., Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security
System?, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 157, 157-170 (2007) (questioning legitimacy of
UN collective security system because of Council's limited and delayed responses
to gross humanitarian disasters in Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda); Thomas G.
Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 741, 756-60
(2006) (describing Council paralysis on Kosovo and failure to intervene in the
Congo and Sudan).
38 Several models of reform have been proposed to make the Security Council
more representative and responsive to global needs. In Secretary General Kofi An-
nan's report, The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, 170, delivered to the Security Council and
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), two models for reform
were presented: Model A would add six permanent members without a veto and
three more non-permanent two-year seats; Model B would add eight four-year re-
newable non-permanent seats and eleven two-year non-renewable non-permanent
seats. However, the most contentious issues of any proposed reform have always
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reforms was produced by a High-Level Panel convened by Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan in 2003. The Panel concluded, in part, that in order to
more effectively fulfill its global mandate, the Council must become more
representative and more willing and able to take action when needed.
39
V. DIRECT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION WOULD MAKE THE COUNCIL A
MORE REPRESENTATIVE AND LEGITIMATE GLOBAL INSTITUTION
Regional representation in the Security Council would enable more
representative leadership with greater legitimacy to address global crises.
Regardless of the nation-states involved, a Council composed of nation-
states will always be divorced from the strengths the UN was envisioned to
possess: multilateral legitimacy and neutrality derived from a lack of vested
interests.40 Direct regional representation would make the institution more
globally representative and would enhance the Council's capacity to make
binding decisions that positively impact all regions of the world.
41
been which new nation-states would receive permanent seats and whether new per-
manent members would receive a veto power. See Mark W. Zacher, The Conun-
drums of International Power Sharing: The Politics of Security Council Reform, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 211, 211-17 (Richard M. Price and
Mark W. Zacher, eds., 2004). Nevertheless, all models involving nation-state ac-
tors, regardless of increased representation, would likely continue to be plagued by
the inherent constraints of nation-state decision-making and the resulting inconsis-
tent fulfillment of Charter principles.
39 Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, 170, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, (Mar. 21, 2005)
(detailing the two proposals for UN reform referenced supra in note 38).
40 See COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 87 (stating that the strength of UN institu-
tions rests on their multilateral legitimacy and neutrality).
41 This paper is meant to serve as an introduction to the possible benefits of such a
system of representation. Admittedly, significant obstacles stand in the way of im-
plementing such reform and such a system would involve substantial risks. Never-
theless, the aim of this paper is to prompt further study and consideration of the
potential long-term efficacy of such reform. There is often significant delay be-
tween the initial conception of a means of social advancement, and the fulfillment
of the idea. Proposals for reform that are not currently realizable are generally met
with significant initial opposition, but over the long-term, the ideas originally only
considered by a few, very often become realistic. See Richard Noyes, The Time
Horizon of Planned Social Change, 39 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 65 (1980) (discussing
how social progress often trails by many years the initial insight that triggered the
progress); see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
66-67 (3rd ed.1996) (explaining how discoveries prompt scientific gain only when
previously standard beliefs are discarded and there is "paradigm destruction").
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1. A regional Security Council would be more representative
Regional representation in the Council would better reflect current
geopolitical realities, both in terms of power distribution and security needs.
A Council without permanent representation for any South American or
African country not only arguably violates the UN Charter,42 but may also
explain the Council's failure to consistently deal with crises on both conti-
nents.43 Furthermore, the P5 no longer reflect the global distribution of
power or the distribution of global security needs. 44 A Council composed
of regional actors would provide more global representation in an institu-
tion tasked with global responsibility.
Although the decision to give permanent representation to five
Northern countries was based on the distribution of world power after
World War II ("WWII"), the Council as presently constituted no longer
reflects the current distribution. After WWII, the P5 held about sixty or
seventy percent of the world's economic, political and military power.45
More than sixty years later, several members of the P5 are no longer among
the most powerful nation-states in the world.46 The P5 collectively now
only contribute thirty-five percent of the UN budget.47 Powerful actors,
both in the world community at-large, and within the context of UN activ-
42 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1 (stipulating that representation in the Security
Council should be based on contribution to the maintenance of peace and security
and equitable geographic distribution).
43 Since the inception of the UN Charter, both South America and Africa have
been plagued by persistent and gross violations of human rights and humanitarian
disasters. For further discussion of the Council's inconsistency in Africa, see infra
Part VII.2. But see Blanca Antonini, El Salvador, in 423 THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY (David M. Ma-
lone ed., 2004) (detailing the Council's key role ending a war in El Salvador in the
1980s). However, the Council's involvement in El Salvador was arguably related
to US national interests. See id. (stating that the United States' close involvement
with El Salvador was a significant factor in the UN's role). Moreover, the Council
stood by while the United States allegedly supported or covered up the acts of
brutal regimes in South America. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, Negroponte's Time in
Honduras at Issue, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2005, at Al (describing the U.S.
Embassy's cover-up of the work of Honduran death squads in the 1980s).
44 See Yozo Yokota, Address at the Foreign Policy Association: The Future of the
United Nations (Apr. 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.fpa.org) (stating
that the P5 no longer represent the majority of power in the world).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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ity, are thus not represented in the Council. Even more, only one "develop-
ing country," China, and no countries from the Southern hemisphere
currently have a veto power.4 1
One powerful actor that has never had a significant voice in the
Council is the Group of 77 ("G-77"). 49 The G-77 was established in 1964
to provide a voice to seventy-seven developing countries in the UN. The
G-77 aims to articulate and promote the collective interests of countries
from the Southern hemisphere. 50 Despite any individual weaknesses,
Southern states have collectively been very active in UN affairs, and, since
the mid 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions have been almost exclusively
Southern-state operations. 51 Despite their collective strength and imple-
mentation capacity, the G-77 has never been given a significant voice in
Council decision-making, and thus the G-77 continues to see much of
Council activity through the distorting lens of the "North-South divide. 52
Council resolutions that interfere with the domestic affairs of Southern
states are viewed as hypocritical, illegitimate meddling by the North and
calls for UN reform are viewed as efforts by the North to further consoli-
date power.53 Direct regional representation would remove the Council as a
perpetual source of the North-South divide.
2. Direct regional representation would give the Security Council
greater legitimacy
Regional representation would also rehabilitate the universal legiti-
macy of Council decision-making and action. As a global institution, the
48 Although increasingly controversial, the term "developing country" remains in
use as a way of classifying countries with a lower level of economic development.
See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Emerging and Developing Economies List,
Apr. 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2O08/02/weodata/
groups.htm#ae.
49 The G-77 is a group, and often a voting block, of seventy-seven developing
countries assembled among the country representatives in the UN General Assem-
bly. The Group of 77 at the United Nations, About the Group of 77, available at,
http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited May 7, 2007).
50 Id.
51 Brian L. Job, The UN, Regional Organizations, and Regional Conflict: Is There
a Viable Role for the UN?, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 227,
232 (Richard M. Price & Mark W. Zacher eds., 2004) [hereinafter Job in THE UN
AND GLOBAL SECURITY].
52 The United Nations: Mission Impossible?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6-12, 2007, at
21.
53 Id.
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UN needs multilateral legitimacy to survive, and legitimacy in the UN con-
text relies on weaker states and regions being able to exert a degree of
influence. Moreover, actions taken by a more representative Council would
likely be subject to less resistance - there would likely be more global sup-
port and more nation-state hesitation to oppose Council decisions.
The erosion of Council legitimacy has been largely a product of its
nation-state composition and the correlated inconsistent intervention based
on nation-state interests. Nation-state decision-making and interests are
most often based on unilateral or bilateral considerations. Inevitably, alle-
giances to domestic interests and realpolitik, and ties to bilateral partners
and strategic allies, will continue to dominate nation-state decision-making.
A Council composed of nation-states will thus never achieve the collective,
universal strength that UN institutions were envisioned to possess. The
strength of universally legitimate UN institutions is founded in their multi-
lateral legitimacy and neutrality, derived from their lack of vested inter-
ests.54 Inversely, as currently constituted, Council decision-making is
accompanied by actual or perceived allegiances to specific nation-state in-
terests. Council resolutions are therefore not perceived as legitimate efforts
to fulfill its Charter mandate, but instead are perceived as spasmodic efforts
dependent on the P5's national interests.
The concern would inevitably exist that regional organizations
would be equally plagued by the power dynamics of member states. It is
possible that regional representation would just create another level of su-
pranational bureaucracy in which powerful states would dictate both action
and inaction. Political and economic interests of specific nation-states may
continue to dominate regional discourse and decision-making. Even when
given a voice through regional representation, poorer countries may con-
tinue to be dominated by countries with more economic and military lever-
age. But regional organizations have proven better able at focusing their
efforts on collective security and human rights concerns. Both Europe and
South America have successfully overcome nation-state divisions to ad-
vance collective action on issues of security and human rights.55 For exam-
ple, many traditionally powerful European Union ("EU") countries have
been willing to cede political and sovereign power for the benefits of re-
54 See COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 86 (describing the strengths of UN institu-
tions that have maintained global legitimacy and neutrality).
55 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; The Maastricht Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7 1992 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
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gional economic and strategic interdependence. 56 Moreover, European
powers have agreed to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights57 and have been increasingly willing to cede foreign policy discre-
tion to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.5 8 As has been seen
in Europe, developing economic and strategic interdependence can create
significant incentives for even powerful nation-states to compromise within
regional arrangements.
Direct regional involvement in the Council would offer more global
representation that would in turn enable more legitimate decision-making.
A more globally legitimate institution, more divorced from nation-states'
unilateral interests, would be better able to provide comprehensive and con-
sistent application of the Council's Charter mandate.
VI. DIRECT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION WOULD EASE THE SECURITY
COUNCIL'S GLOBAL BURDEN AND ENABLE MORE COMPREHENSIVE
FULFILLMENT OF ITS CHARTER MANDATE
Direct involvement of regional organizations in the Security Coun-
cil would effectively lighten its global burden and enable more comprehen-
sive fulfillment of its Charter mandate. Chapter VIII of the Charter
specifically develops the role of regional organizations in fulfilling the
Council's mandate. Chapter VIII states that:
The Security Council shall encourage the development of
pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional
arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the ini-
56 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 55, arts. G, J.2 (stipulating European Union
Member State commitment to both economic and strategic foreign policy
interdependence).
57 See European Convention on Human Rights supra note 55, arts. 32-35 (estab-
lishing the jurisdiction of the Court over contracting parties to the European
Convention).
58 The Common Foreign and Security Policy set forth obligations specifically ad-
dressed to EU representation in international organizations: "Member States shall
coordinate their action in intemational organizations and at international confer-
ences. They shall uphold the common position in such forums." Maastricht
Treaty, supra note 55, art. J.2. Even before the Maastricht Treaty, the European
Community had agreed to coordinate national positions on foreign policy and adopt
common positions in its representation to international organizations. See The Sin-
gle European Act, art. 30(2), Feb. 2, 1986 ("The High Contracting Parties shall
endeavour to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a
cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.").
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tiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Se-
curity Council.59
Although there are as of yet no formal arrangements whereby regional orga-
nizations answer to the Council for the security of their region, the Charter
expressly foresaw that regional organizations would be vital to maintaining
international peace and security and lightening the Council's global burden.
Indeed, since the mid-1990s, regional organizations have played a central
role in the implementation of Council resolutions. 60 Under international
law as presently conceived, however, regional organizations relied upon for
implementing action must wait for Council authorization.61 To this point,
such authorization has been irregular and inconsistent based on the P5's
national interests. Direct participation by regional organizations in the
Council would serve to effectively decentralize and streamline decision-
making and implementation. 62
Prior to the mid-1990s, the major powers managed regional con-
flicts which promoted their geopolitical advantage, and regional institutions
were not involved. When it was in their national interest to resolve con-
flicts, the P5 would interpose peacekeeping forces between fighting par-
ties.63 While this style of peacekeeping was effective when collective
national interests inspired collective political will, it has not consistently
addressed intrastate and regional conflicts that have become the primary
threats to international peace and security. 64 Early in the 1990s, UN Secre-
tary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali realized that the Council was in an in-
creasingly untenable position. Its institutional capabilities to organize and
59 U.N. Charter art. 52, paras. 1-3.
60 See FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 12, at 296-99 (describing the rise in UN-
regional peacekeeping partnerships in the 1990s in both Africa and Europe).
61 See U.N. Charter, art. 53, para. 1 ("no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Se-
curity Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state .. .[or]
directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state . . .");
see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state .. ").
62 See An Agenda for Peace supra <CITE _Ref166262717">, [ 5; see also Mi-
chile Griffin, Retrenchment, Reform and Regionalization: Trends in UN Peace
Support Operations, 6 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 1-31 (1999).
63 See Job in THE UN AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 51, at 230 (discussing
the policy inconsistencies among the P5 in responding to regional and intrastate
conflicts during the 1990s).
64 See id.
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supervise peacekeeping missions were inadequate to deal with the breadth
and nature of intrastate and regional conflicts. Boutros-Ghali thus turned to
regional organizations for support, advocating the deeper involvement of
regional actors to ease the Council's burden. 65 Boutros-Ghali, in effect,
promoted a division of labor for Council peace enforcement: regional actors
were to provide the manpower and the resources, while the Council was to
authorize, establish mandates, and oversee operations. In other words, in
exchange for capabilities, the UN would provide universal legitimacy. 66
Despite Boutros-Ghali's vision, formal decentralization and delega-
tion arrangements for security tasks never materialized. 67 But regional ac-
tors have, in many instances, become informally responsible for
implementing Council resolutions. The devolution of Council tasks to re-
gional actors arguably began with the Balkan crisis, continued with
peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Tajikistan, 68 and is further exempli-
fied by the current reliance on the African Union in Darfur, Sudan.69
Nevertheless, despite reliance and devolution to regional actors for
implementation, as presently constituted, the very possibility of internation-
ally lawful action depends on P5 authorization. Direct reliance on regional
organizations would serve to overcome the collective action failures of the
65 An Agenda for Peace supra note 20, 64 (calling for "regional action as a
matter of decentralization, delegation, and cooperation... [to] not only lighten the
burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation consen-
sus and democratization in international affairs.")
66 See generally W.A. Knight, Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking
and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Charter Operational,
17 THIRD WORLD Q. 31, 31-52 (1996) (characterizing subsidiarity as a potentially
efficacious organizing principle to achieve improved division of labor and respon-
sibility in collective security efforts).
67 See Joint Inspection Unit, Report on Sharing Responsibilities in Peace-keeping:
the United Nations and Regional Organizations, 47-54, JIU/REP/95/4 (1995)
(prepared by Faith K. Bouayad-Agha & Boris P. Krauslin) (detailing several areas
of collaboration between the UN and regional organizations, but noting that be-
cause of varying resources and capacities, "there should not be a rigid formula for
the division of labour between [regional organizations] and the United Nations.").
68 See FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 12, at 297 (detailing the UN Observer
Mission in Liberia that partnered with the Economic Community of West African
States, and the UN Observer Mission in Tajikistan that partnered with the Com-
monwealth of Independent States).
69 See Bbc.co.uk, AU Extends Darfur Troop Mandate, Sept. 21, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5362762.stm (announcing that AU force respond-
ing to humanitarian crisis in Sudan would be strengthened, along with logistical
support from the UN).
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current P5 by ensuring that for every human rights crisis there is a represen-
tative in the Council with a direct interest in addressing the issue.
VII. A SECURITY COUNCIL COMPOSED OF REGIONAL MEMBERS WOULD
MITIGATE COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURES AND MORE EFFECTIVELY
ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES
A system of direct regional representation would better overcome
the collective action problems of Security Council decision-making. The
Council's current structure has led to consistent collective action failures in
response to gross human rights violations. There is a significant disincen-
tive for any nation-state to authorize action that interferes with another na-
tion-state's sovereignty. The disincentive is also codified in the Charter as
a prudential limit on interference with national sovereignty. 70 Of course,
the prudential limit was meant to be overcome by the Council when neces-
sary to fulfill its global mandate.7' But when balancing national interest
against their global responsibility, the P5 nation-states have consistently fa-
vored their national interest. Thus, the current Council model has resulted
in consistent collective action failures, even in response to the most egre-
gious human rights violations. A system of regional representation would
better overcome the collective action problems that have plagued the cur-
rent nation-state model. Decision-making as well as implementing action
taken by strategically interdependent regional organizations would provide
more efficient, more accountable and more comprehensive fulfillment of
the Council's mandate.
1. Nation-states and collective action problems
The nation-state Security Council model, regardless of the nation-
states involved, will likely continue to be plagued by collective action fail-
ures. Collective action failures result when parties to a group have diver-
gent incentives and interests, but are meant to achieve collective results. 72
Achieving collective action therefore relies on the coordination of separate
and selective incentives to stimulate all members to act in a group-oriented
70 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.").
71 Id. ("but [the domestic jurisdiction principle] shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.").
72 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION chs. 1-4
(1965) (explaining the theory of collective action and collective action failure).
2009 OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE 17
way. 73 The Council is prone to collective action problems because the in-
tended result, the maintenance of international peace and security, is often
non-excludable and usually does not specifically benefit the decision-mak-
ers. Collective action becomes especially difficult where individual mem-
bers can unilaterally block coordination. Achieving collective action in the
Council context thus relies on both ensuring at least one group-member's
incentive to initiate action, as well as mitigating other P5 members' interest
in unilaterally blocking collective action.
With the Council's current composition, collective action has only
been achieved when a specific member of the P5 has had a strong incentive
for action and when no P5 member has had an incentive to block collective
intervention. In 1991, the Council achieved collective authorization of the
Persian Gulf War because the US had a particular interest in the region and
the Iraqi government was universally condemned for its invasion of Ku-
wait. 74 Universal condemnation of international law violations, however,
including gross human rights violations, has not consistently inspired col-
lective action. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia demonstrated the col-
lective action difficulties of a Council composed of nation-states. Even
though the Council had declared the same linkage between human rights
and international peace and security as it had previously recognized in re-
sponse to the Persian Gulf conflict, the Council remained reluctant to au-
thorize the use of force. 75 The political will of the P5 influenced Council
decision-making on the Balkans, and the gravity of the conflict was insuffi-
cient to overcome the perceived political costs of intervention.76 Therefore,
despite similarly gross human rights violations, the military intervention au-
thorized in the Persian Gulf was never authorized in the Balkans.77
73 Id.
74 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (condemning Iraq's
violations of international law and authorizing Member States to use "all necessary
means ... to restore international peace and security").
75 Despite authorizing the use of "all necessary means" and a multinational imple-
mentation force (IFOR) for delivering humanitarian assistance and preventing fur-
ther human rights violations in the Balkans, the Council made clear that it remained
more reluctant to use force in the Balkans than in the Persian Gulf. COATE ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 158. See also S.C. Res. 1034, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1034 (Dec.
21, 1995) (condemning "in the strongest possible terms the violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and of human rights by Bosnian Serb forces" but not au-
thorizing military intervention). But see S.C. Res. 1035, 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1035 (Dec. 21 1995) (establishing a UN civilian police force).
76 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 158.
77 Id. at 157.
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Failures in the Council have also resulted from unilateral national
interests that prompt a block of collective action. For example, no member
of the Council has denied the exigency of the current crisis in Darfur, Su-
dan. But despite the unanimity of rhetoric, China has had a strong commer-
cial interest in tempering its condemnation because it buys eighty percent of
Sudan's oil exports. 78 China has thus used its veto power to delay and di-
lute Council efforts.79 The failure to achieve collective action with regard
to Darfur is not an isolated example, but instead further exemplifies the
Council's failure to overcome nation-state interests.
In the post-Cold War period, reasons for Council paralysis have
included economic, political and strategic interests among the P5. During
the crisis in Kosovo in the late 1990s, Russia's strategic interests and alli-
ances in the region severely limited the Council's ability to react to gross
human rights violations. 80 Also, in 2000, members of the Council sought to
condemn Zimbabwe's dictator, Robert Mugabe, for Zimbabwe's violent ex-
propriation of white farms that violated international human rights. Yet,
China's economic interests in the country once again led to a block of all
Council action. 81 Even more, Russia and China's oil interests in Burma led
them to block a recent resolution condemning Burma's regime for its ex-
treme brutality and human rights violations. 82
Security Council collective action failures have also been a product
of nation-state disinterest. As much as particular nation-state interests have
served to block Council action in particular crises, the lack of any particular
national interest among P5 members in a specific crisis has also precluded
or stalled collective action. Many more people died in Rwanda in 1994 and
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002 than died in Kosovo in
1999. Yet the Council, pushed by Western allies, demonstrated far more
interest in the human rights violations in the Balkans than in Africa.8 3 The
tragic experience of Council inaction with regard to Rwanda exposed the
limitations of the current Council model and further eroded the Council's
legitimacy and moral authority as a global institution. 84
78 Mallaby, supra note 35, at 14.
79 Id.
80 See Wechsler in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 67 (describing
the Council's inability to react to the Kosovo crisis because of the veto system).
81 Mallaby, supra note 35, at 14.
82 Id.
83 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 161.
84 Job in THE UN AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 51, at 230.
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2. Nation-states are not well-situated to authorize intervention into
sovereign territory
The inherent sovereign nature of nation-states makes them reluctant
to authorize intervention into the sovereign territory of other nation-states.
Notably, no interstate complaint has ever been brought under any of the UN
treaty-based procedures.85 Although the multilateral legitimacy of the
Council is meant to provide political cover for nation-state actors authoriz-
ing intervention into sovereign territories, in reality, the P5, who decide
issues under global scrutiny, remain understandably reluctant to authorize
such interventions. The responses to human rights crises in Africa demon-
strate this reluctance and the resulting inconsistency and ineffectiveness of
the current Council model.
In 1992, the Council authorized a UN military operation in re-
sponse to the Somalian crisis. 86 A crucial factor to overcoming traditional
nation-state reluctance to interfere in intranational crises was Somalia's
unique situation of not having a national government.8 7 Therefore, unlike
the later crises in Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Sudan, the Council did not have to bypass the consent of any sovereign
government to intervene.
By contrast, in Burundi in the early 1990s, intrastate ethnic vio-
lence was resulting in the "slow-motion genocide" of about 150,000 per-
sons over a five-year period.8  In considering an intervention force, the
Council asked fifty UN member-states if they would provide troops for a
peacekeeping mission. Only twenty-one responded, and, of these, only
three offered troops because of their reluctance to intervene in an intrastate
conflict.89 Also, in Rwanda in 1994, intrastate ethnic violence and exten-
85 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 776 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip
Alston eds., 2000) (stating that no interstate complaint has ever been lodged
through any of the various UN treaty-based complaint procedures, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 41 procedure).
86 S.C. Res. 751, 2, U.N. Doc. SEC/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992). In the early
1990s, Somalia experienced human rights disasters because of societal breakdown
and famine resulting from political and economic problems. See generally George
B. N. Ayittey, The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution, 205 CATO POL'Y
ANALYSIS J. (1994).
87 See Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another
Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 979, 985 (2006) (stating that there was no Somali
government to control the various warring factions during the civil war).
88 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 160.
89 Id. (citing N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22 1996, at A9).
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sive atrocity crimes caused the deaths of approximately 800,000 persons.90
The lack of incentives among Council members to take action, combined
with the existence of a sovereign Rwandan government, caused paralysis in
the Council and a collective failure to mitigate the egregious atrocities.91 In
the case of Rwanda, the Chinese delegation was particularly unwilling to
authorize similar action in Rwanda as it had agreed to in the former Yugo-
slavia. China was afraid that two such intervention resolutions would es-
tablish too great a precedent for international interference in a nation-state's
sovereign territory. 92
Chinese membership in the Council exemplifies the inherent
problems of nation-state decision-making for a global institution. A pattern
has emerged with regard to China's voting that demonstrates its "principled
position" on Chapter VII resolutions: China is reluctant to authorize the use
of the Council's enforcement authority to intervene in a UN member state's
sovereign territory. 93 China's reluctance has been exhibited across a variety
of enforcement resolutions, including peace enforcement in the cases of
Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda, sanctions in Libya and Yugoslavia, and the es-
tablishment of ad-hoc tribunals to prosecute widespread human rights
abuses in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 94 The Chinese block to col-
lective action has only been overcome when another member of the P5 has
had sufficient incentive to apply significant bilateral pressure to secure Chi-
nese abstention instead of veto. 95 Collective action failures thus result, as is
currently occurring with regard to Darfur, Sudan, whenever there is no
other P5 state with a direct national interest in overcoming the Chinese
"principled position." Moreover, the principle of non-intervention, al-
though uniquely articulated as a national position by China, has been em-
braced by Russia as well.96 The international community was forced to
intervene in Kosovo in the late 1990s without Council authorization be-
90 COATE ET AL., supra note 14, at 160.
91 Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke, Rwanda, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM
THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 483, 485-87 (David Malone ed., 2004).
92 Nigel Thalakada, China's Voting Pattern in the Council, in THE ONCE AND
FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL 83, 94-95 (Bruce Russett ed., 1997).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 For example, the remaining P5 were able to obtain Chinese abstention to estab-
lish the ad-hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See id.
96 During the cold-war period, the veto, or the threat of veto paralyzed the Coun-
cil. See David M. Malone, Introduction, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE
COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 1-4 (David M. Malone ed., 2004). Also,
during the Kosovo crisis, the Russian veto severely limited the Council's ability to
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cause of Russia's threatened veto.97 And Russia has also embraced non-
intervention as a defense to accountability for its international legal obliga-
tions in Chechnya.98
3. Direct regional involvement would mitigate collective action
problems
The direct involvement of regional organizations would ensure that
a party with a direct interest in any human rights crisis, in any region of the
world, would be a part of Council decision-making. Human rights crises
most often result from intrastate or regional conflicts, and thus regional rep-
resentation is most likely to guarantee consistent incentives for Council in-
tervention. Regional organizations' direct interest in achieving settlement
of such conflicts derives primarily from their desire to avoid widespread
regional conflicts as well as the spill-over effects of intrastate conflicts. 99
Furthermore, regional organizations have demonstrated significant consid-
eration of human rights protection and would thus be more likely to take
action based on gross human rights violations. Direct regional representa-
tion would likely better overcome collective apathy at both the decision-
making and implementation stages.
Regional actors with direct concerns about spill-over effects of
human rights crises would have strong incentives to overcome collective
action problems in the decision-making process. Most human rights crises
result in significant refugee flows, miasmas of disease and crime, and po-
tential regional destabilization. 100 Regional organizations, and their nation-
state members, would thus likely have the necessary incentives to push for
Council authorization for intervening action where necessary. Through
greater accountability to directly affected nation-states, regional representa-
tion would likely better overcome the collective action problems inherent in
current Council decision-making.
react to severe human rights violations. See Wechsler in THE UN SECURrrY COUN-
CIL, supra note 17, at 67.
97 Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,
24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703, 706 (2006); A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian Intervention and
International Law 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 725, 729 (2004). For a description
of Russia's alleged violations in Chechnya, see infra Part VII.3.
98 Asbjom Eide, Chechnya: In Search of Constructive Accommodation, 14 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 431, 433 (2001).
99 Job in THE UN AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 51, at 235.
100 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand
Themes of UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 619, 624-25 (2005).
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A system of regional representation would also better serve collec-
tive action problems inherent in multilateral implementation efforts. The
Council has already acknowledged the advantages of devolution of imple-
mentation to regional organizations.' 0 ' A system of direct regional repre-
sentation would likely further boost the legitimacy and capacity of regional
implementation of Council authorizations. When confronting intrastate or
regional crises, regional organizations are better able to assemble a coalition
force, incur lower costs in doing so, and are able to approach the crisis with
cultural sensitivity and local knowledge. 0 2 Moreover, as regions become
more strategically and economically interdependent, nation-state members
of regional organizations will likely be more responsive to calls from strate-
gic and economic allies facing the destabilizing effects of human rights cri-
ses nearby. Nation-states in interdependent regional organizations have the
necessary realpolitik incentives to provide resources for regional collective
action. Thus, direct regional representation would streamline the process of
authorization to implementation, and in the context of human rights crises
this would likely save countless lives.
The Council has already recognized the benefit of shifting from
general UN responsibility for peace and security to a regionalist approach,
where the Council authorizes operations that are primarily executed by re-
gional organizations. 10 3 The deeper involvement of NATO in the manage-
ment of the Balkan crises, as well as the AU's role in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sudan, exemplifies the devolution of UN
peacekeeping mandates to relevant regional actors. 10 4
Regional actors' efficacy in responding to intranational conflicts
was also strikingly demonstrated by the conflict in Chechnya. The conflict
between Russia and Chechen separatist forces in the 1990s involved grave
violations of international humanitarian law. 10 5 As in the intranational
101 Job in THE UN AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 51, at 235.
102 Id.
103 FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 12, at 295.
104 MARC OTTE, ESDP AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS: WORKING
WITH NATO, THE UN AND OSCE reprinted in 35 THE EU's SEARCH FOR A STRA-
TEGIC ROLE: ESDP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, at 43
(Esther Brimmer ed.) (2002).
105 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUSSIA'S WAR IN CHECHNYA: VICTIMS SPEAK
OUT (Jan. 1, 1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Russia.
htm ("Russia's consistent pattern of firing on civilians grossly violates its humani-
tarian law obligations"); Fred Hiatt, Moscow Warns West on Criticism over
Chechnya, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1995, at A26 (citing the Human Rights Watch
report).
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armed conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, civilians were targeted by the war-
ring parties. 10 6 Still, the international community consistently characterized
the events in Chechnya as an internal matter of the Russian Federation.
0 7
And the Russian veto power in the Council obstructed any UN ability to
hold the Russian government accountable for their international legal obli-
gations. Nevertheless, Russian membership in a regional organization
prompted supranational involvement in the conflict. Russian membership
in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") com-
pelled the Russian government to recognize the applicability of OSCE prin-
ciples to its conduct in Chechnya. 10 8 The Russian Federation allowed the
OSCE to play a role in resolving the conflict and monitoring human rights
violations. 10 9 OSCE delegations determined that Russia's bombing cam-
paigns had targeted civilian populations and had thus violated OSCE and
international legal norms. As a result, Russia was forced to admit that it
had violated the human rights of its citizens.' 10 In the end, the OSCE's
106 Id.
107 In Bosnia, the Council found a threat to international peace and security that
justified international intervention. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (Aug.
13, 1992) ("Recognizing that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a
threat to international peace and security."). With respect to Chechnya, however,
foreign governments demonstrated a general unwillingness to label that crisis an
international conflict or a threat to international peace and security. See Patrick
Bishop, West Turns Blind Eye to Terror Tactics, DAILY TEL. (London), Jan. 5,
1995, at 14, ("Europe and United States quick to reinforce Russian claim that
Chechnya is an internal matter"); Hiatt, supra note 105, at A26.
108 OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Gyarmati's Moscow Mission, MTI EcONEWS (Hun-
gary), Jan. 11, 1995, available at LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File ("The OSCE
and Moscow also agree that settlement of the Chechen conflict is a common inter-
est and that it should be carried out through political negotiations in conformity
with the constitution of the Russian Federation and the basic principles of the
OSCE.").
109 See OSCE Delegation to Visit Chechnya Within Days, REUTERS NEWS JAN. 18,
1995, available at LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File ("A delegation from the
[OSCE] will travel to Russia's rebel region of Chechnya this week to... examine
the observation of OSCE agreements, especially on human rights"); see also Chrys-
tia Freeland & John Thornhill, Russia to Allow Human Rights Team in Chechnya,
FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1995, at 22 ("Russia agreed ... to allow an interna-
tional diplomatic mission to assess human rights violations and humanitarian needs
in Chechnya ... [t]he move marked an apparent retreat from Russia's insistence
that the crisis in the breakaway region was an internal matter.").
110 See Press Conference with Russian Federation Justice Minister Valentin
Kovalyov on the Results of the OSCE Session, held by Official Kremlin Int'l News
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capacity as a regional actor provided the international community with the
ability to address what the UN had been essentially forced to characterize as
an "internal matter" of Russia."'
4. Economic interdependence as a strategic precursor to further
regional cooperation
The ability of regional organizations to overcome collective action
problems to promote human rights protection is demonstrated by the strate-
gic interdependence and collective human rights achievements of the EU
and the Organization of American States ("OAS"). In the Americas and
Europe, because of strong regional human rights and collective security
agreements, the prospects of future conflicts and gross human rights viola-
tions appear far more remote. Because of the lure of regional economic and
strategic interdependence, nation-states in the EU and OAS have agreed to
strong regional human rights arrangements, modifying their insistence on
the principles of noninterference and the inviolability of state
sovereignty. 12
Despite their emergence in Europe and the Americas, strong re-
gional organizations, with strong regional capacities for the protection of
human rights, have not yet taken form in other regions. Human rights and
collective security mechanisms in other regional organizations such as the
African Union ("AU") have not achieved the capacity or legitimacy to hold
member states accountable for human rights violations. 13 Consequently, a
system of direct regional representation may not be an advisable reform for
protecting human rights in the short-term. Nevertheless, organizations such
as the AU are progressing in their collective commitment to human rights
protection. 14 Indeed, the AU and the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
Broadcasts, (Feb. 6, 1995), available at LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File
("[W]e cannot deny the circumstance that in the course of the [Russian] operation
to disarm unlawful [Chechen] armed formations the fundamental right of persons to
life was violated. This cannot be denied because stray bullets, stray shrapnel
claimed the lives of peaceful totally innocent people.").
"'l Duncan B. Hollis, Accountability in Chechnya - Addressing Internal Matters
with Legal and Political International Norms, 36 B.C. L. REv. 793, 843 (1995).
112 Job in THE UN AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 51, at 238.
113 Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the Recommendations of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12
(2007) (discussing the reasons for nation-state noncompliance with non-binding
recommendations of the African Commission on Human Rights).
114 Id. at 33 (stating that the African Union is more dedicated to the protection of
human rights than its predecessor the Organization on African Unity); see also
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tions (ASEAN) have both pledged to promote regional peace and stability
through adherence to the Rule of Law and UN Charter principles." 5 Fur-
thermore, the increasing interdependence of regional economic and security
interests will likely continue to develop regional commitment to mitigating
the regional instability caused by gross human rights violations.
To remain globally competitive in both economic and military
terms, regional organizations will likely continue to develop where they
have not yet achieved sustained integration. As demonstrated by Europe,
economic integration can serve as an effective precursor to strategic interde-
pendence and human rights protection. Although the need for economic
integration has been widely recognized among African countries in the Af-
rican Economic Community ("AEC"), 116 the AEC Treaty provides for the
gradual establishment of the Community and thus continent-wide integra-
tion has not yet been achieved." 17 Even more, there is not yet consensus on
the most effective form of regional organization." 8 But the importance of
regional integration in Africa, and the urgency with which it must be pur-
sued, has been well documented."l 9 The interdependence and infrastructure
RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 28-30 (2004) (discussing the central-
ity of human rights in Africa's Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa).
115 See The ASEAN Declaration, 2 (Bangkok 1967) (stating "that the aims and
purposes of the [Regional] Association shall be... to promote regional peace and
stability through ... adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter")
[hereinafter ASEAN Declaration]; Commission of the African Union, 2004-2007
Strategic Plan, at 48, available at http://www.africa-union.org/AU summit 2004/
volume 2 final - English - June 2004.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007) (committing the
African Union to strategic objectives of the Rule of Law, good governance and
collective human security).
116 Richard Frimpong Oppong, Observing the Legal System of the Community: The
Relationship Between Community and National Legal Systems under the African
Economic Community Treaty, 15 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 41, 44 (2006).
117 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1241.
118 Oppong, supra note 116, at 44.
119 See, e.g., id. at 43; Econ. Comm'n for Afr., Assessing Regional Integration in
Africa, at IX (2004), available at http://www.uneca.org/arial/ ("It is reasonable to
assume that the most significant trend in this new millennium is global competi-
tiveness .... [N]ations are moving to integrate their economies with those of their
neighbors .... This shift is nowhere more urgent than in Africa, where the com-
bined impact of our relatively small economies, the international terms of trade,
and the legacy of colonialism, mis-rule, and conflict has meant that we have not yet
assumed our global market share-despite our significant market size.").
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necessary for collective regional human rights protection may thus soon
develop.
Although regional representation holds much promise, some re-
gional organizations may shield their member-states -from external critiques
on human rights, thereby possibly hampering the efficacy of regional re-
sponsibility for human rights protection. 20 For example, contrary to inter-
national law, ASEAN has invoked sovereignty to shield member-states who
engage in systematic human rights violations. 121 Nonetheless, the reaction
of the EU to ASEAN's shielding demonstrates the potential efficacy of in-
stitutionalized regional dialogue within the Council. The EU has pressured
ASEAN to comply with its international human rights obligations as part of
trade negotiations. 122 Although a nation-state would likely remain reluctant
to take on ASEAN for their human rights failures, fearing retaliatory reper-
cussions, the EU has demonstrated the ability of a supranational actor to
engage in constructive dialogue and economic pressure in response to
human rights violations. 123 Where a nation-state would be dominated by
unilateral incentives, the EU as a regional actor was able to address supra-
national and collective concerns.
5. Won't powerful nation-states continue to dominate decision-making?
Direct regional representation could produce similar collective ac-
tion failures as the current Council model because the nation-states that
120 See Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: 'Promises
to Keep and Miles to go Before I Sleep', 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 1 (1999)
("ASEAN has marginalized human rights and has consistently opposed the use by
foreign states or international organizations of economic or other forms of pressure
to induce change in human rights practices."); see also AU rejects Bashir Darfur
charges, BBC, Jul. 21, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
7517393.stm (describing the AU's call for the Security Council to suspend war
crimes accusations against Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir despite alleged gross
human rights violations in Darfur).
121 Invoking sovereignty as a protective shield against a state's treatment of indi-
viduals within its territorial boundaries is inconsonant with customary international
law -human rights matters fall outside the insulation of the domestic jurisdiction
clause in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. See generally Louis Henkin, Human
Rights and State 'Sovereignty,' 25 GA. J. Ir'rr'L & COmP. L. 31 (1994); W. Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990); Rudolf Bernhardt, Domestic Jurisdiction of States and
International Human Rights Organs, 7 HUM. RTs. L. J. 205 (1986)
122 Thio, supra note 120, at 50 (discussing the impact of East Timorese and Bur-
mese human rights violations on EU-ASEAN trade negotiations).
123 Id.
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comprise regional organizations would arguably always align with national
interests instead of collective interests in human rights protection and secur-
ity. Furthermore, many would argue that without a regional intervention
capacity, powerful national interests will continue to dominate regional re-
source-allocation decisions. Although accurate in describing realpolitik
motivations that have largely dominated the history of nation-states, such
arguments are based on assumptions that will not necessarily hold true in
the future. First, such arguments assume that it will never be in the national
interest of nation-states to concede power to regional institutions and re-
gional human rights conventions. The very existence of the EU, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights are striking demonstrations of how national interests and
alliances can shift. Secondly, it may be wrong to assume that a strong re-
gional capacity must precede the willingness of nation-states to concede
power to regional organizations. Instead, the prospect of a Council com-
posed of regional actors could galvanize the large majority of nation-states
that would continue to lack a global voice without a system of regional
representation. As demonstrated by the G-77, coalitions of less powerful
nations can exert significant influence. And coalitions of smaller states
have already been able to play an effective constraining role on major pow-
ers in regional organizations such as the EU and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation. 24 Thus, even though some regional organizations are not cur-
rently supported by powerful nation-states, large groups of countries align-
ing could provide the strategic incentives necessary for even the most
dominant countries to align with regional decision-making. 25
Increasing economic and strategic interdependence may also moti-
vate the most powerful nation-states to cooperate with regional organiza-
tions. Regional economic cooperation and strategic interdependence has
been the premise of successful efforts at regional integration and organiza-
124 Nancy Viviani, Regional Arrangements and Democratic Reform of the United
Nations, in BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 312, 325 (Albert
J. Paolini, Anthony P. Jarvis & Christian Reus-Smit eds., 1998) ("[I]t is quite clear
already in existing regional bodies like APEC and the EU, that coalitions of smaller
states play an effective constraining role on the ambitions of their major core
powers").
125 Previous alliances with other security arrangements such as NATO also raise
issues of practicality in achieving unified European security policy positions.
However, an analysis of the continued viability of NATO, OSCE and other multi-
lateral security organizations and their relationship to the EU is not within the
scope of this paper.
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tion. 126 Both economic cooperation and strategic interdependence are col-
lective results that benefit all nation-state members in regional
organizations. Yet, even with significant interdependence, there remains
the possibility that powerful nation-states will continue to try to influence
regional action based on unilateral interests, through economic and military
leverage. However, as the EU and OAS demonstrate, as regions become
more interdependent, unilateral interests become increasingly difficult to
promote over collective regional interests, including the maintenance of re-
gional human rights norms.127
The political cover provided by a Council composed of regional
actors could further mitigate powerful nation-states' incentives to block col-
lective action based on unilateral interests. As currently constituted, the
Council forces the P5 to balance their global duties under the UN Charter
with their unilateral national interests in a universally transparent forum. 128
Direct regional representation in the Council would reduce the burden on
powerful nation-states to balance their competing interests. Powerful coun-
tries may relish the opportunity to hide behind the cover of regional organi-
zations on human rights issues that have proven politically sensitive for
individual nation-states and their bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, despite the advantage of political cover for decision-
making, reliance on regional organizations for implementation may place
the burden on those who are comparatively ill-equipped to do S0.129 Pres-
ently, no regional organization has the military capacity to independently
126 See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (The
Treaty of France), entry into force Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S 140; Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (The Treaty of Rome), entry into force
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; ASEAN Declaration, supra note 115.
127 The European Court of Human Rights has developed the legitimacy to rule on
what would previously be considered the most sovereign of matters, including ad-
ministration of the military and government. See, e.g., United Communist Party of
Turkey v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121 (1998) (holding that the dissolution of a
Turkish political party by the Turkish government infringed on the European Con-
vention of Human Rights and the right to political participation in democratic soci-
eties); Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, (1999)
(holding that restriction of gay participation in the military is not necessary in a
democratic society).
128 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (expressly codifies this balance, stating that the UN
shall not intervene in matters of domestic jurisdiction, but "this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." ).
129 The OAS, ASEAN do not currently have effective peacekeeping coordination
capacity or standing forces. See Int'l Civilian Mission in Haiti, OAS/UN, Regional
Cooperation and Increasing the Peacekeeping Capacity of the UN: Role of the
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take on humanitarian interventions - a state of affairs which would limit
the short-term efficacy of any formal regional delegation arrangement. But
several regional organizations are developing common security policies and
the capacity to take on regional operations. The EU is currently developing
their European Security and Defence Policy'30 and both the OAS and the
AU have pledged to develop increased capacity to address conflicts in their
respective regions in accordance with the UN Charter. 131 Further, although
regional organizations are far from being operational military actors, re-
gional standing armies are likely not prerequisites to the collective action
benefits of decision-making and implementation by regional representa-
tives. Even without regional armies, regional organizations remain better
suited to inspire collective action to both address conflicts and to assemble
coalition forces to intervene.
6. Will the UN be able to hold regional organizations accountable?
The Council's mandate is largely based on the legitimacy of global
involvement in Charter decision-making and enforcement. Implementation
by regional organizations could undermine the global legitimacy of UN in-
tervention. Moreover, the Council may have difficulty holding regional op-
erations accountable. But UN Observer Missions could serve as a model
for further regional devolution. 32 The Council has deployed several UN
Observer Missions - peacekeeping operations comprised of a small number
of military observers - to monitor and partner with substantial regional sta-
bilization forces.133 Although not without setbacks, 134 the partnerships have
OAS, (OCT. 26, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports/arg.
htm.
130 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 55, art. J.4 (developing the European Com-
mon Defence Policy).
131 FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 131, at 208. See also African Union Non-
Aggression and Common Defense Pact, art. 10, Jan. 31, 2005, available at http://
www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Non%20Aggression% 2 0
Common%20Defence%20Pact.pdf (agreeing that the African Peace and Security
Council shall be responsible for the common defence of Africa; also, agreeing to
develop and strengthen the African Standby Force and other regional implementa-
tion mechanisms).
132 UN Observer Missions have been deployed in Liberia (UNOMIL), Georgia
(UNOMIG) and Tajikistan (UNMOT). FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 12, at
296-97.
133 S.C. Res. 866, 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (Sept. 22, 1993) (deciding that
UNOMIL will work in cooperation with two regional forces, ECOWAS and
ECOMOG, to implement a peace agreement in Liberia); S.C. Res. 937, 6, U.N.
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had success in providing stability to regions faced with intrastate con-
flicts. 3 Such joint arrangements could alleviate concerns about regional
actors' accountability to the Council, while also maintaining the global le-
gitimacy of UN involvement in Charter enforcement.
VIII. DIRECT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION WOULD ALSO ENHANCE
INDIRECT HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Direct regional representation would also enhance the efficacy of
indirect methods of human rights protection. The Security Council cur-
rently has several methods at its disposal for addressing gross human rights
violations without direct military intervention. Among the methods are: (1)
the establishment of ad-hoc tribunals; (2) referrals to the International
Criminal Court; and (3) the enforcement of Human Rights Council 1235
procedures. The efficacy of all three of these existing methods would likely
be enhanced by a Council composed of regional actors. Direct regional
involvement could also enable new methods of human rights enforcement,
including collaboration between the Council and regional human rights
institutions.
Doc. S/RES/937 (July 21, 1994) (deciding to expand UNOMIG's mandate to in-
clude direct observation and cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent
States' peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, Georgia); S.C. Res. 1138, 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES1138 (Nov. 14, 1997) (deciding that UNMOT's mandate will include coop-
eration with the Commonwealth of Independent States' peacekeeping forces as
well as the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe's Mission in
Tajikistan). UN Observer Missions have also been employed to monitor cease-
fires without any partnering regional force. E.g., S.C. Res. 693, 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/693 (May 20, 1991) (deciding to deploy the United Nations Observer Mission
in El Salvador to monitor peace agreement following civil war); S.C. Res. 1118,
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1118 (June 30, 1997) (establishing the United Nations Ob-
server Mission in Angola to monitor the peace process following civil war in
Angola).
134 See, e.g., id. (stating that the regional force in Liberia (ECOMOG) "was argua-
bly a force for stability in an otherwise chaotic situation", but discussing the "diffi-
cult relationship" between ECOMOG and UNOMIL).
135 See id. (describing that the "impulse for action" in Liberia, Georgia and Tajikis-
tan "came from within the region, and was led by a key power within it, acting
through a regional political/security structure"); see also Przemyslaw Ozierski,
UNOMIG Prolonged - But Will it Be Effective?, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTI-
TuTE ANALYST, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/
5061 (discussing the Security Council's renewal of UNOMIG's mandate in Octo-
ber 2008, and the valuable role UNOMIG has played in monitoring the ongoing
conflict).
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1. Ad-hoc tribunals
Using its Chapter VII powers in the early 1990s, the Council estab-
lished the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") in
attempts to hold perpetrators of gross human rights violations accountable.
The ICTY and ICTR symbolized novel attempts at establishing ad-hoc
tribunals on behalf of the international community instead of leaving justice
in the hands of post-conflict victors. 136 Nevertheless, the Council and the
ad-hoc tribunals were denounced for being politicized. Critics distrustful of
the P5's power questioned the selectivity of establishing tribunals for Bos-
nia and Rwanda, but not for several other post-conflict situations, and thus
questioned the tribunals' legitimacy. 37
Direct regional representation would enable the Council to establish
ad-hoc tribunals with greater objectivity and legitimacy. A major source of
resistance to ad-hoc international tribunals, and the resulting inconsistency
of their establishment, has been the fact that many states have been leery to
establish legal mechanisms that could someday be used against them.138
Regional organizations are more inclined to consider the international legal
principles in need of protection without being hamstrung by nation-state
concerns of sovereignty and future vulnerability. Furthermore, a Council
composed of regional actors that better represents global interests would be
perceived as, and in reality be, more able to be consistent and equitable in
the selection of post-conflict situations deserving of ad-hoc tribunals.
2. International Criminal Court Referrals
The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court ("ICC") pro-
vides that the Security Council can refer any "situation" to the ICC under its
Chapter VII enforcement powers for investigation and possible prosecu-
tion. 139 The existence of a permanent international court holds significant
136 Joanne Lee & Richard Price, International Tribunals and the Criminalization of
International Violence, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY 123, 125
(Richard M. Price & Mark W. Zacher eds., 2004) (stating that the ad-hoc tribunals
symbolized a departure from the victor's justice of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribu-
nals of the 1940s).
137 See GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 278 (2000).
138 Lee and Price, supra note 136, at 126.
139 See Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, art. 13, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 99 (establishing jurisdiction of the Court over situations referred
by the Security Council) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Phillipe Kirsch, John
T. Holmes & Mora Johnson, International Tribunals and Courts, in THE UN SECUR-
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potential for close cooperation with the Council, and the Rome Statute envi-
sions the ICC as a future replacement for ad-hoc tribunals. But referral to
the ICC requires the unanimous consent of the P5 and the majority consent
of the other Council members. The requirement of unanimous P5 consent
has already severely politicized and constrained the ICC referral power. 140
In fact, the United States has been able to veto even hypothetical areas of
ICC jurisdiction. 141
Direct regional representation in the Council would better enable
the close and cooperative relationship with the ICC envisaged by the Rome
Statute. As the Council is currently composed, the legitimacy of ICC refer-
rals, and the actual and perceived independence of the ICC's administration
of justice remains at risk. Without the inherent constraints of nation-state
decision-making, the Council would be able to make decisions divorced
from concerns of future national vulnerability or bilateral allegiances, and
instead more objectively analyze the gravity of human rights crises in
question.
3. Human Rights Council 1235 Procedures
Under the UN Economic and Social Council's Resolution 1235, the
UN Human Rights Council ("HR Council") is authorized to hold annual
debates regarding gross human rights violations. 142 Based on the proce-
dures laid out by Resolution 1235, the HR Council has various options for
addressing such violations. One option is to call upon the Security Council
to take up the issue with a view to considering the adoption of sanctions or
other punitive measures. 143 To date, the option of referral has never been
invoked and, thus, because of the Security Council's unique capacity to take
ITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 281, 287 (David Ma-
lone ed., 2004) (describing the Security Council's ability to refer situations to the
ICC).
140 See generally Steven Freeland and Michael Blissenden, The International Crim-
inal Court: Politics, Justice and Impunity, in AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND SO-
CIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTION:
WHAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW? (T. Dunworth ed., 2003).
141 Because of concerns that U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia would become subject to
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the U.S. vetoed the renewal of the UN's peacekeeping
mandate in Bosnia. See Lee and Price, supra note 136, at 133.
142 Economic and Social Council Res. 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1)
at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (June 6, 1967).
143 Comment on the 1235 Procedure and its Potential Outcomes, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 620, 621 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston
eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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binding action, 1235 violations have rarely been addressed with more than
studies and advisory reports. 144 The availability of consistent Security
Council enforcement, divorced from national interests and concerns about
future vulnerability, would likely enhance the prospects of inter-council
collaboration.
4. Referral to regional human rights institutions
Direct regional involvement could also enable collaboration be-
tween the Security Council and regional human rights institutions. The Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ("IACHR") have demonstrated the efficacy of regional ad-
ministration of human rights violations. The regional courts already have
strong records of human rights protection and their jurisprudence is largely
respected within their respective regions.1 45 The ECHR and the IACHR's
ability to develop regional legitimacy has been largely based on their use of
region-specific human rights agreements1 46 and their nuanced consideration
144 Id. In order for consistent inter-council collaboration to develop, the newly
constituted Human Rights Council would also likely need to overcome persistent
institutional failures. See generally Morton H. Halperin & Diane F. Orentlicher,
The New UN Human Rights Council, 13 No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2006). The
scope of this paper, however, does not allow for analysis of this issue.
145 See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics
of the New ECHR Control Mechanism As Established by Protocol No. 11, 15 HUM
RTS. L. J. 81, 82 (1994) ("The [European] Convention's achievements have been
quite staggering, the case-law of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights exerting an ever deeper influence on the laws and social realities of State
parties."); see also David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-
American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 28
(David Harris and S. Livingstone eds., 1998) (describing the relative efficacy of the
Inter-American human rights institutions in gaining state compliance).
146 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights adjudicates based on the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights. Statute of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. 448 (IX-0/79) (1980) ("The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights is an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the applica-
tion and interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights."). The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights adjudicates based on the European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 55. See ECHR.coe.int, The European Court of Human
Rights, Basic Information on Procedures, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/
Header/The+CourtlProcedure/Basic+information+on+procedures/ (last visited May
7, 2007) (stating that Contracting States to the Convention and individuals claiming
to be a victim of a violation of the Convention may lodge an application to the
Court).
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of region-specific and country-specific differences. 47 At the UN level, the
consideration of human rights violations is often criticized for failing to
take into account regional differences.148 Regional court referrals could
thus prove to be an attractive mechanism for achieving respected and bind-
ing resolutions of human rights cases.
In fact, the availability of Security Council referral to regional
courts could enable binding adjudication of far more human rights cases. 149
The jurisdiction of the ICC is expressly limited to consideration of the most
serious crimes 150 and the UN currently does not have any other binding
judicial institution at its disposal. Although the Council has never had any
formal association with regional human rights institutions, as discussed
supra in Part VI, Chapter VIII of the Charter specifically contemplates col-
laboration with regional organizations for the maintenance of international
peace and security.' 51 Nevertheless, regional court referral may appear to
be an unproductive exercise because regional courts only exist in regions
that have already developed advanced mechanisms for the protection of
human rights. But only the ECHR has achieved near universal adherence to
its decisions.1 52 Therefore, the IACHR, and other regional courts if and
147 See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYS-
TEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 122 (Macdonald, Matscher &
Petzold eds., 1993) (describing the ECHR practice of interpreting the Convention
with a "margin of appreciation" for country-specific circumstances).
148 See, e.g., Report of the Special Representative on Iran, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/
32 (Dec. 28, 1998) (submitted by Maurice Danby Capithorne) (reporting to the
Human Rights Commission on the human rights situation in Iran without making
any mention of Shari'a law).
149 The regional court admissibility criteria would need to be amended for a Coun-
cil referral mechanism to become operational. Currently, based on Articles 33-35
of the European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR only admits interstate
applications from a High Contracting Party of the Council of Europe, or any per-
son, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be a victim
of human rights violations by a High Contracting Party. See European Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 55, arts. 33-35. Also, Article 61 of the American
Convention on Human Rights would have to be amended. See American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, art. 61, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("Only the States
Parties and the [Inter-American] Commission shall have the right to submit a case
to the Court.").
150 Rome Statute, supra note 139, art. 5.
151 U.N. Charter ch. VIII.
152 See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No
Longer a Unicorn, Not yet an Ox, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 31, 32 (David Harris & S. Livingstone eds., 1998).
2009 OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE 35
when they develop, would stand to benefit from the global legitimacy of
Council referral and the threat of binding Council action in the case of non-
compliance with court decisions. And the legitimacy of a formal referral
mechanism could spur the development of additional regional courts and
thus enhance global human rights protection.
IX. NATION-STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS AN OBSTACLE TO
DIRECT REGIONAL REPRESENTATION
The major obstacle for direct regional representation in the Council
is nation-state sovereignty. The UN was founded as an intergovernmental
organization of independent states 53 and the Charter specifically defines the
Council as consisting of fifteen Member States. 154 The implementation of a
system of direct regional representation would thus require an amendment
to the Charter. As stipulated by Article 108 of the Charter, an amendment
would require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and the votes
of each P5 member. 155 National resistance to regional representation would
likely come from both the P5 as well as nation-states in other regions that
do not want to cede security policy discretion to regional organizations.
1. Overcoming the objections of the P5
For a system of regional representation to ever occur, the current P5
would have to relinquish their stranglehold on Council decision-making. 56
153 U.N. Charter art. 3 ("The original Members of the United Nations shall be the
states which ... sign the present Charter"). Also, the principle of national sover-
eignty is arguably codified in the UN Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7
("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.")
151 U.N. Charter arts. 3, 23 (providing that "Members" are nation-states and that
"[t]he council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations,"
respectively).
155 U.N. Charter art. 108.
156 Any amendment to the Charter, and thus the composition of the Council, would
be subject to the veto of the P5. See U.N. Charter art. 108 ("Amendments to the
present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when
they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General
Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes
by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent
members of the Security Council.").
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Although the prospects of overcoming the P5's ability to veto such reform
may seem daunting or impossible in the short-term, over the long-term,
continued Council collective action failures may create sufficient incentives
among other UN member-states to exert the necessary diplomatic pressure
on the P5 to overhaul the Council. Another critical factor is that, over the
long-term, objections from regions that are currently unrepresented will
likely grow stronger. As nation-states in unrepresented regions become
stronger both economically and militarily, their calls for representation may
become impossible to ignore. For example, as South America continues to
gain economic strength, states such as Brazil and Venezuela will likely de-
mand equal and thus permanent representation in the Council. A system of
regional representation may thus be the best way to appease such calls for
representation without further paralyzing the Council by adding more na-
tion-states that each have their own realpolitik interests.
2. Overcoming other national sovereignty objections
As has been the experience in the development of the EU's Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, 157 there will inevitably be states that
strongly resist ceding their security policy discretion to regional actors. But
despite inevitable resistance, economic and strategic interdependence may
provide the necessary incentives for even the most reluctant nation-states to
cooperate with regional organizations. As regional organizations and inter-
national human rights law continue to emerge, national sovereignty may no
longer remain as sacrosanct a principle. Much of the reason for codifying
the traditional role of nation-state sovereignty in the Charter was to preserve
reciprocal respect of domestic sovereignty among state parties. The tradi-
tional conception of national sovereignty is eroding, however, based on in-
ternational human rights law and humanitarian interventions. 15  It is now
157 See John Temple Lang, The Main Issues After the Convention on the Constitu-
tional Treaty for Europe, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 544, 565 (2004) (describing the
unwillingness of large EU Member States to give complete discretion to the Euro-
pean Commission over foreign and security policy).
158 The human rights movement, that began with the Nuremberg Tribunal and is
now codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, creates legal obli-
gations for State parties with regard to treatment of their own citizens. See gener-
ally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A(XXI), U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966). See also Wechsler
in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 65 (detailing the "chipping away"
of the supremacy of state sovereignty).
2009 OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE 37
widely understood that nation-state sovereignty is not absolute, particularly
when states agree to international human rights treaties and multilateral ar-
rangements. 59 In fact, international law now prohibits nation-states from
using sovereignty as a shield for the treatment of its own civilians. 60 And
the "responsibility to protect" is emerging as an additional legal basis for
multilateral intervention into intrastate crises.' 6'
Given these developments, the UN as established in 1945 may no
longer most effectively address the evolving threats to international secur-
ity. Proponents of the responsibility to protect agree that the Council re-
mains the most appropriate body to authorize international interventions in
response to gross human rights violations. 162 Yet, the notion that individual
nation-states can, or will, consistently authorize intervention into human
rights crises in other sovereign territories is becoming increasingly tenu-
ous.' 63 Post-cold war threats to peace and security have been largely intra-
state conflicts, for which regional operations are likely better suited.64 As
159 See An Agenda for Peace, supra note 20, at 17 ("[t]he time of absolute and
exclusive sovereignty ... has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.");
see generally Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacro-
sanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L An. 95 (1992)
(describing sovereignty as a "legal fiction" and noting that the "exclusivity and
inviolability of state sovereignty are increasingly mocked by global
interdependence").
160 UN interventions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter themselves demon-
strate that the shield of sovereignty is not absolute. See Saira Mohamed, From
Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal For a Revitalized United Nations
Trusteeship Council, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 836-837 (2005) (stating that a new
conception of sovereignty permitting international intervention has been recognized
by the UN and by scholars).
161 The "responsibility to protect" principle argues that state sovereignty implies
responsibility, and thus in cases where a population is suffering serious harm as a
result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure and where the state in
question was unwilling or unable to provide protection, the principle of noninter-
vention yields to an international responsibility to protect. See Gareth Evans and
Mohamed Sahnoon, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN ArF. 99 (Nov./Dec.
2002), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faessay9995/gareth-
evans-mohamed-sahnoun/the-responsibility-to-protect.html; see also Wechsler in
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 66 (discussing the international com-
mission which produced The Responsibility to Protect report).
162 Id.
163 See OrrE, supra 104, at 4.
164 See FORMAN AND GRENE, supra note 12, at 296 (describing the benefits of
regional involvement in intrastate conflicts).
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provided by the UN Charter, individual states may only use military force
in self-defense and thus the legitimacy of multilateralism is becoming a
necessary condition for the effective maintenance of peace and security. 165
Constrained by international law and unilateral national interests, nation-
states are likely no longer the most effective actors to fulfill the Council's
global mandate.
X. CONCLUSION
The Security Council's reliance on nation-states will likely con-
tinue to fail as a global mechanism for collective security and the preven-
tion of human rights disasters. When considering the potential efficacy of
institutional organization and reform, it is necessary to consider both the
short-term and long-term interests involved. While the political realities of
nation-states do not often favor short-term compromise in favor of long-
term results, supranational organizations are better suited to maneuver in
the present with regard for the future. Nation-state actors are prone to act in
a limited self-interest, even in the context of an organization that demands
global and intergenerational responsibility. The inherent economic and po-
litical realities of nation-states disfavor remedial action on a global scale.
Nation-state self-interest in the Council has thus often caused collective ac-
tion failures. And without any prospect for an international standing army,
regional organizations will continue to be the best option for implementing
Council resolutions. Just as regional actors are better able to overcome col-
lective action problems to take implementing action, regional actors would
likely more consistently inspire decisions consistent with Charter principles
on human rights protection.
In the short-term, a push to reform the Council would be a formida-
ble and likely unachievable task. Despite the trend towards reliance on re-
gional organizations for implementation, direct representation for many
regions is likely not a short-term option. Regional organizations that do
exist are not all well-established and parts of the world remain unrepre-
sented. Also, powerful nation-states stand in the way of any short-term
overhaul of the Council system. In the long-term, however, an evaluation
of the viability and desirability of the proposed institutional reforms should
be based on geopolitical trends and likely threats to peace and security.
National power and politics change, and thus supranational organizations
should not feel constrained by current power distribution when considering
165 See U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security.").
2009 OVERCOMING COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE 39
long-term innovation. Instead, to more effectively maintain international
peace and security in the long-term, the UN must adjust to evolving geopo-
litical realities. Since the end of World War II, regional and intrastate con-
flicts have become the dominant threats to security. Yet nation-states
remain understandably reluctant to intervene in the sovereign affairs of
other countries. Nation-state interests preclude consistent and comprehen-
sive fulfillment of the human rights protection mandated by the UN Char-
ter. Therefore, if the ultimate goals of the Security Council are global
collective security and human rights protection, relying on the collective
action of nation-states will continue to be unreliable.

